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1. Introduction 
According to Reid (1969, 283) motives are an ens 
rationis. Because of that they may influence to action, but 
they do not act as causes or as agents, that is motives are 
only advisory (cf. Seebaß 1993, 329; Lehrer 1989, 210). 
Instead motives presuppose an efficient cause, namely an 
agent (cf. Rowe 1991, chapter 4), and the agent’s freedom 
(Reid 1969, 284). In opposition to Leibniz (1994, 84-85) 
who defends subtle reasons Reid (1969) claims that 
motives have to be conscious (cf. Seebaß 1993, 269). For 
to "be influenced by a motive of which I am not conscious, 
is, ..., an arbitrary supposition without any evidence, ... ." 
(Reid 1969, 285) 
Reid (1969, 288-290) distinguishes between 
animal motives, which human beings have in common with 
animals and which influence the will by impelling us, and 
rational motives, which are peculiar to rational beings (cf. 
Seebaß 1993, 269) and which influence the will by 
convincing us of what we ought to do. Only the latter are 
proper motives (Reid 1969, 290). Reid (1969, 287) poses 
contrary motives of the same kind, which differ only in 
quantity, like bribes of different amounts, and contrary 
motives of different kind, like money and fame. 
According to Reid (1969, 95) motives are related 
to other concepts as follows: "By principles of action, I 
understand every thing that incites us to act. ... To every 
action ..., there must be some incitement, some motive, 
some reason." Reid (1969) distinguishes between (1) 
"mechanical principles of action", like "instinct" and "habit", 
where no motives are present, (2) "animal principles of 
action", like "appetites", "affections", and "passions", and 
(3) "rational principles of action". In Reid's (1969, 329) 
discussion of Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason Reid 
interprets "reason" among other things as "motive", so that 
in some cases "reason" can be equated with "motive".  
Advocating free will Reid (1969, 283-293) criticises 
several postulates of the necessity doctrine of his time. I 
will deal with Reid's responses. 
 
2. Reid on every deliberate action must 
have a motive 
Reid (1969, 285) claims the truth or falsity of this 
thesis depends on the meaning of the word "deliberate". 
He distinguishes:  
(i) The original meaning of the word: If a deliberate 
action is an action where motives are weighed, then there 
must be motives and also contrary motives. For otherwise 
they couldn't be weighed. 
(ii) The common meaning of the word: If a 
deliberate action is an action which is done by a cool and 
calm determination of the mind, then there are 
innumerable many actions done without a motive. For if 
motives are marked by consciousness, then there are 
many unimportant actions done every day where the agent 
isn't conscious of a motive. Because there are many 
actions performed without a motive, the common meaning 
of the word "deliberate" seems to be more appropriate.  
According to Reid motives are marked by 
consciousness; for there is no proof of unconscious 
motives. Yet if one takes unconscious motives like Leibniz 
(1994, 85) to be habits, then Reid's claim turns out to be 
false. For one can gather evidence of habits quite easily. 
But one can doubt that Reid would accept habits as 
unconscious motives; he rather considers them as 
mechanical principles of action. Besides one usually 
knows one's habits, so that they are conscious after all. 
Even if they are not conscious at the moment, they can be 
made conscious by asking the person what kind of habits 
she has. Thus habits are potentially conscious.  
Yet one can argue for unconscious motives: If 
there are words which lie on the tip of the tongue, which 
one is certain to know, and which need only a trigger to 
come to the fore, why shouldn't there be also unconscious 
motives which just need a trigger for becoming conscious? 
Reid would probably respond by claiming that such 
motives are no counterexamples to his position, because 
they are potentially conscious. Another argumentation for 
unconscious motives can be taken from Reid (1969, 286-
287): Reid states that there is wilfulness, caprice, and 
obstinacy among human beings, because we have names 
for them. Likewise one can argue that there are 
unconscious motives. For we have a name for that. Yet 
having a name for something, for example, 
extraterrestrials, doesn't prove their existence.  
Contrary to Leibniz (1994, 40-41) who claims that 
nothing is without reason Reid (1969, 285-286) postulates 
that there are many unimportant actions performed every 
day without any conscious motive. For there are many 
important intended goals, like paying one's debt, which can 
be done by several different means, like paying with this or 
that shilling, in which the agent has no difficulty in taking 
one of them despite his indifference to these means. Thus 
the agent is free to want this or that shilling for payment. 
Because Buridan's ass doesn't differ from the shilling case 
(Reid 1969, 285-286), the ass has no difficulty in taking 
one of the haystacks to cure its hunger, thereby going 
against Leibniz' and Locke's (1961) point of view. 
Locke (1961, 220) postulates that freedom of 
action consists primarily in the ability to postpone the 
decision "till they have looked before them and informed 
themselves whether that particular thing which is then 
proposed or desired lies in the way to their main end, and 
make a real part of that which is their greatest good", so 
that the agent cannot pay his debt and Buridan's ass dies 
of hunger still waiting for a decisive reason to pay with this 
particular shilling respectively to eat this particular 
haystack. Yet Locke could save his action theory by 
maintaining à la Leibniz that there are no Buridan 
situations in real life. 
Yet if one asked the agent why did you take this 
particular shilling for paying your debts, the agent would 
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probably answer: I took this shilling, because I wanted to 
pay my debts and because this particular shilling was 
equally apt for this purpose as any other one. Thus there 
seem to be motives present in the shilling case. If one 
objects that the agent didn't address the question by his 
answer, because he didn't say why he preferred this 
particular shilling to the other ones, one can respond that 
agents don't distinguish between two kinds of motives 
while deliberating: Motives which speak for a particular 
action and motives which speak for preferring one 
particular action over the other ones. Agents rather 
consider every available motive during deliberation. 
One can question the analogy. For Buridan's ass 
is construed in such a way that there is no reason, not 
even subtle ones, to prefer one particular haystack, while 
in the shilling case such reasons can be present. Reid 
(1969, 285-286) only states that each coin can be used for 
payment leaving the possibility open that the coins don't lie 
in equal distance from the agent, so that he can cite 
economical or habitual reasons for taking the nearest one. 
One can defend Reid by saying that an agent searching in 
his purse for a shilling doesn't perceive a difference in the 
distances of the shillings to himself, so that the analogy 
holds after all. Against this one can object that an agent 
arguing in this way must also be able to tell me when a 
difference counts. This seems difficult to me. For I cannot 
see how an agent can legitimate that a difference doesn't 
count up to a certain point and that it counts from a certain 
point onwards. Thus the analogy isn't perfect. 
 
3. Reid against if there is only one motive, 
then this motive must determine the agent 
According to Reid (1969, 286-287) motives are not 
the sole causes of action, because there is also wilfulness, 
caprice, and obstinacy among human beings. If one denies 
that the latter exist, one has to explain why they have 
names in all languages. If one, however, affirms that they 
exist, a single motive doesn't have to determine the agent. 
Yet having a name for something doesn't prove its 
existence. In the case of extraterrestrials it couldn't even 
be evidence for its existence. In the case of wilfulness, 
caprice, and obstinacy, however, like in the case of human 
freedom of will and unconscious motives, it could be 
evidence for our feeling to be wilful, capricious, obstinate, 
and free, and for our feeling that there are unconscious 
motives, but not for its sole existence. 
 
4. Reid on if there are contrary motives, 
then the strongest motive must prevail 
Since Reid (1969, 287-291) defends agent 
causation, he maintains that the agent determines which 
motive prevails, be it the strongest or not. For contrary 
motives can be compared to "advocates pleading the 
opposite sides of a cause at the bar" where the "sentence 
is in the power of the judge" (Reid 1969, 288) and not in 
the power of the advocates.  
Because the defenders of the necessity doctrine 
have never explained what is meant by the strongest 
motive (Reid 1969, 287-288), one cannot judge whether 
the strongest of contrary motives must prevail. Reid then 
argues that either we measure the strength of motives by 
their prevalence or by some other measure distinct from 
their prevalence. If we do the former, we are confronted 
with two possibilities: (1) If we define the strongest motive 
as the one which prevails, then it is true indeed that the 
strongest motive prevails. Yet this means no more that the 
strongest motive is the strongest motive, and one still 
cannot judge whether the strongest motive prevails. (2) If 
one takes the strength of a motive to be the cause of its 
prevalence, and not its prevalence like in (1), one takes for 
granted that motives are the sole causes of actions which 
Reid (1969, 286-287) already has argued against. 
Therefore after having dismissed these two possibilities 
Reid does the latter and devises two tests by which the 
strength of motives can be tried, namely an animal and a 
rational test of the strength of motives. While the former 
consists of the competition of animal motives for 
prevalence, where the strength of animal motives is 
perceived by our feeling, the latter consists of the 
competition of rational motives for prevalence, where the 
strength of rational motives is perceived by our judgement. 
While animal/rational motives are strongest/weakest when 
tried by the animal test, animal/rational motives are 
weakest/strongest when tried by the rational test. Hence 
according to Reid the strongest motive doesn't always 
prevail.  
The necessitarian would probably object that even 
if we suppose agent causation and that the agent 
determines which motive prevails, the prevailing motive 
becomes the strongest, when it is chosen, so that the 
strongest motive prevails after all. Although the first 
definition of strongest motive can be criticised, the second 
definition does better. For as I already pointed out Reid's 
argumentation against motives as sole causes of actions 
isn't conclusive. The necessitarian could maintain that 
Reid's animal and rational test of the strength of motives is 
no improvement to the prevalence definition. For to say 
with regard to the animal test that the strongest motive is 
the one to which the agent "can yield with ease or which it 
requires an effort of self-command to resist" (Reid 1969, 
289) doesn't give an objective standard either by which the 
strength of animal motives can be measured. Besides 
yielding with ease is just the opposite side of the coin of 
prevailing. With regard to the rational test it is also not 
convincing to say that the strongest motive is the one 
"which it is most our duty and our real happiness to follow" 
(Reid 1969, 290), because one has to explain what the 
latter actually means and whether this amounts to an 
objective standard. Thus Reid's proposal has several 
weaknesses. 
 
5. Reid on we draw conclusions from an 
agent's motives to his actions, as we draw 
conclusions from other causes to their 
effects 
Reid (1969, 291-292) objects that we reason from 
an agent's motives to his actions, because agents act as if 
they are free, that is foolish agents prefer present small 
gratification, whereas wise agents prefer the greater and 
more distant good. Thus the analogy to cause and effect 
doesn't hold. 
Yet acting as if they are free, doesn't prove that 
they are really free. For even if motives are no causes, 
there might be other causes which might determine the 
agent and which might even explain the different behaviour 
of wise and foolish agents. E. g. there might be genes 
which are responsible for the wise and foolish behaviour, 
in the sense that they determine the behaviour of the agent 
completely, so that agents are not free after all. If we take 
certain genes to cause certain motives which in turn cause 
wise respectively foolish behaviour, even the analogy to 
cause and effect can be saved and the necessitarian wins 
out. 
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6. Reid on if human beings are free and are 
not directed by their motives, then their 
actions can only be capricious, and 
rewards and punishments have no effect 
Although human freedom of will may be abused by 
foolish and vicious agents to result in capricious actions, 
Reid (1969, 292) concedes, this doesn't mean that human 
freedom of will cannot be put to its proper use, namely to 
act wisely and virtuously. 
If we suppose human freedom of will and see 
transgressions of human and divine law, this can be 
explained by the following: While rewards and 
punishments may have no effect on foolish and vicious 
agents, they have their due effect on wise and virtuous 
agents (Reid 1969, 292-293). If we, however, suppose the 
necessity doctrine to hold and see transgressions of law, 
then rewards and punishments have not been strong 
enough to produce obedience to the law, that is they have 
not functioned properly and therefore cannot be properly 
called rewards and punishments.  
With regard to the second scenario where the 
necessity doctrine holds one can object that it is to be 
expected that rewards and punishments don't function 
properly in all cases; and even if there are transgressions 
of law, there are also many cases of obedience to the law, 
so that rewards and punishments work properly in these 
cases and can be properly called in that way.  
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